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FOREWORD
On November 19, 1990, the Conventional Armed Forces in
Europe (CFE) Treaty was signed in Paris following the successful
completion of 20 months of negotiations between the members of
NATO and the Warsaw Pact Treaty Organization. At its completion
President Bush hailed the agreement as ending the" . . . military
confrontation that has cursed Europe for decades." Despite the
dramatic nature of this document, the large scale reduction
required of all signatories, and the complex inspection regime it
established; the completion of the treaty was overshadowed by the
ongoing deterioration of the Warsaw Pact, end of the Berlin Wall,
and impending conflict in the Persian Gulf between Iraq and the
coalition headed by the United States. Even these events paled to
insignificance in comparison to the dissolution of the Soviet
Union roughly 1 year later. In this study, the author examines
the viability of this agreement in the post-Cold War era. He
describes the scope of the treaty, how it was adapted to meet
many of the changes that have occurred, and how it has moved
towards final implementation in November 1995.
The author describes the problem of the flank limitations
that Russian and Ukrainian forces must subscribe to at the end of
the implementation period. Both countries have argued that they
can no longer live with these restrictions and have formally
requested that they be removed or modified. He notes that there
has been little progress towards resolving this impasse, and
there is every indication that the Russian Federation will be in
violation of the CFE accord in November of this year. This
development indicates not only Russian disquiet with the treaty
but larger questions concerning the role of various "players" in
the Russian national security process and the direction of
Russian foreign policy. The author then suggests a framework that
NATO should adopt in formulating a policy towards the flank
question.
The final portion of the study is devoted to the future role
of conventional arms control in American foreign policy. Here the
author discusses the implications that a compromise or failure in
CFE implementation may have on broader questions of policy as
well as the areas of emphasis for the Review Conference scheduled
for spring 1996.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to publish this
report as a contribution to understanding this issue of U.S.
national security policy.
WILLIAM W. ALLEN
Colonel, U.S. Army
Acting Director
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SUMMARY
This study examines the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty with respect to the process of implementation to
date and prospects for final implementation in November 1995. It
describes the basic points of the treaty and the danger posed by
the ongoing disagreement between NATO and the Russian Federation
over the limitations imposed by the treaty on Russian forces in
the "flank areas" (Leningrad and North Caucasus Military
Districts in the Russian Federation). It analyzes the positions
of the primary NATO members, Russian Federation, Ukraine, as well
as the United States, and places the treaty in the broader
context of Russian foreign policy and the future of conventional
arms control. The main findings are as follows.
The Treaty and Implementation Process.
• The Treaty consists of over 110 pages of text encompassing
23 Treaty articles, protocols, and two annexes. There are two
legally binding agreements and four other political documents
associated with the overall accord. It limits five categories of
weapons between the NATO and Warsaw Pact (tanks, artillery,
armored combat vehicles, helicopters, and attack aircraft). The
area of agreement is further subdivided into geographic subzones
with limits for each area. Overall limits for each alliance are
20,000 tanks; 30,000 armored combat vehicles; 20,000 artillery
pieces; 6,800 combat aircraft; and 2,000 attack helicopters. The
treaty is designed to be implemented by stages with each country
reducing by 25 per cent of its overall requirement the first
year, 60 per cent in 1994, and 100 per cent by November 1995 with
a period of four months (until March 1996) to verify residual
levels.
• Despite the tremendous changes that have occurred since
1989, the treaty remains in the best interest of the United
States. It has prevented arms racing, increased the level of
transparency, reduced the possibility of both surprise attack and
miscalculation, and enhanced conventional deterrence. The treaty
also provides for annual notifications of changes to force
structure as well as overall information exchanges. Lastly, it
requires countries to comply with stringent force requirements
and assists in the continuing momentum of the process which may
have positive effects in other areas.
• Implementation has proceeded well. All reduction targets
have been achieved with the exception of Armenia and Azerbaijan.
The treaty has provided opportunities for NATO to cooperate with
the new states of Eastern Europe and emerging countries of the
former Soviet Union in terms of arms control inspector training
and transfer of data. By September 1994 over 18,000 items of
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treaty limited equipment (TLE) had been destroyed including 6,000
from the Russian Federation. There has been no evidence of a
concerted effort by any party to cheat or intentionally mislead
inspection teams.
The Problem of the Flanks.
• The eventual implementation of the treaty by the end of
1995 remains uncertain. The Russian Federation has protested that
it must be relieved of Article V which limits Russian forces in
the Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts (referred to
as the "flanks"). The Ukraine has also protested these
restrictions as discriminatory and beyond its capability. Russian
officials have argued that they will need roughly 400 tanks,
2,400 ACVs, and 800 artillery pieces in excess of what they are
authorized to confront growing tensions particularly on their
southern flank. This area includes Chechnya where the Russians
are likely to desire a large force for an extended period of time
to defeat Chechen forces and maintain control.
• The Russians and Ukrainians have proposed various
solutions to this impasse, but most have required a significant
change to the treaty which might well require the agreement to be
resubmitted to national assemblies for ratification. NATO has
opposed these solutions and urged Russia and the Ukraine to seek
solutions within the "flexibility of the treaty." Turkey and
Norway (the countries most directly affected by increased Russian
forces on the flanks) have strongly opposed any change to the
treaty, and this position has been endorsed by France in the High
Level Task Force (HLTF). Turkey has suggested that it might
withdraw from the treaty if Russian demands are met.
Implications of the Ongoing Disagreement.
• The position of the Russian Federation on this issue may
well reflect other factors and difficulties. The various
"players" in the Russian national security process (Ministry of
Defense, General Staff, President, Foreign Minister, and Ministry
of the Interior) have at times openly disagreed. Furthermore, it
is difficult to envisage Russian leaders compromising on this
issue shortly before the next Russian presidential elections in
June 1996. Lastly, any compromise which allows a significant
increase in Russian forces in the south has serious implications
for their policies towards the "near abroad" and reincorporation
of these countries into the Commonwealth of Independent States
(CIS).
• As we approach the last year of implementation, NATO must
act quickly to find a solution. In doing so the NATO members must
keep in mind the broader issues confronting the Alliance. Failing
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to do so may not only compromise the treaty but also submit NATO
to severe internal dissension. If a compromise can be found and
the treaty is fully implemented many of the issues now being
discussed will be on the agenda at the followup conference in the
spring of 1996.
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THE CFE TREATY:

A COLD WAR ANACHRONISM?

Introduction.
On November 19, 1990 the Conventional Armed Forces in Europe
(CFE) Treaty was signed in Paris following the successful
completion of 20 months of negotiations between the members of
NATO and the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO). At its completion,
President Bush hailed the agreement as ending the ". . . military
confrontation that has cursed Europe for decades."1 Despite the
dramatic nature of this document, the large scale reduction
required of all signatories, and the complex inspection regime it
established, the completion of the treaty was overshadowed by the
ongoing deterioration of the Warsaw Pact, end of the Berlin Wall,
and impending conflict in the Persian Gulf between Iraq and the
coalition headed by the United States. Even these events paled to
insignificance in comparison to the dissolution of the Soviet
Union roughly one year later. Consequently, many observers
announced the imminent demise of the CFE Treaty. The London
Times, for example, sounded a particularly distressing note when
it announced: "Europe"s most ambitious arms control treaty risks
becoming unworkable because of the Soviet Union"s
disintegration."2
Almost paradoxically, the CFE Treaty has survived the early
reports of its demise. This is perhaps testimony to its value and
the relative importance participating states attach to it.
Ongoing changes did slow its entry into force as it was not
provisionally applied until July 17, 1992. It became legally
binding on all parties 10 days after the last country deposited
its instruments of ratification which was not until November 9,
1992.3 The purpose of this study is to examine the future
viability of the CFE Treaty for the United States. This suggests
two additional queries: Will the treaty be fully implemented
within the 40 months allocated? If so, what are the prospects for
future conventional arms control in Europe?
The rapid pace of the CFE negotiations, the ability of
participating states to deal with extraordinary change, and the
steady progress towards full implementation illustrate many of
the primary aspects of arms control in general and conventional
arms control specifically. First, arms control only serves as a
part of any nation"s overall national security strategy. As such
it is a "method" to be used in seeking the overall "objective" of
improved security. It is not an objective in isolation.
Consequently, though the focus of any negotiation is the details
of the prospective agreement, the arms control process must
always be consistent with the overall direction of national
security strategy. Second, "arms control" differs significantly
from "disarmament." While this may seem self-evident to most
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people, the terms are misused so frequently that it deserves
emphasis. "Arms control" is a policy method whereby states seek
through negotiations to improve their security. It can not change
ideologies and may not reduce hostilities. Normally objectives
are to improve predictability, diminish the possibility of
miscalculation (particularly in a crisis), and reduce
confrontation. "Disarmament," however, is either unilateral or
imposed on states normally by the victors in war such as Germany
and Japan after World War II or Iraq (to some degree) following
the Gulf War. Third, arms control is a political process and can
not be divorced from other aspects of a nation"s security or
foreign policy. It is affected by domestic events, other issues
between states, and the bureaucratic process of the participating
parties. Consequently, progress in one arms control forum may be
affected (positively or negatively) by the success or failure of
other negotiations and previous agreements. Lastly, conventional
arms control is more difficult and less likely to result in
success than nuclear arms control. The military resources at
issue in a conventional negotiation are complex components of a
nation's overall military capability. Furthermore, as in CFE,
conventional negotiations are coalition or alliance undertakings
which means that the political and economic institutions of many
states are both involved and affected by the result. The final
result must improve the overall security of all member states and
be consistent with agreed alliance strategy.4
The Treaty.
The CFE Treaty consists of over 100 pages encompassing 23
Treaty Articles, several protocols, and two annexes. There are
also six legally binding statements and several other political
documents associated with the overall accord. The agreement
limits five categories of weapons in the European territory of
the members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization and the
former Warsaw Pact (referred to as "groups of states parties")
stretching from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains. The
area of the application (AOA) is further subdivided into five
geographic sub-zones. Each of these areas have sublimits for the
amount of treaty limited equipment. The purpose of zones was to
force the relocation of Soviet forces eastward from the innerGerman border and to prevent their concentration within the
Soviet Union. The AOA changed with the dissolution of the
Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) as the Baltic States
left the treaty upon achieving their independence. Any forces
from the Russian Federation present on their soil, however,
counted against the overall total for the Russia. In addition, a
portion of southeastern Turkey is excluded from the treaty due to
Turkish concerns about security issues relating to Syria and
Iraq.
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Though the treaty was negotiated in a multilateral forum, it
is firmly rooted in the alliance formations of the Cold War--NATO
and the Warsaw Pact. Despite the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact
the bloc-to-bloc character of the treaty continues and will do so
until at least final implementation in 1996. Overall limits for
each alliance are as follows: 20,000 main battle tanks; 30,000
armored combat vehicles (ACVs) with subcategories for three
different varieties; 20,000 artillery pieces; 6,800 combat
aircraft which excludes trainers, strategic bombers, and
transport aircraft; and 2,000 attack helicopters. In addition, no
single nation may have more than 33.3 percent of the total group
entitlement for tanks (i.e., 13,300); 33.3 percent of armored
combat vehicles (i.e., 20,000); 34.4 percent of the artillery
(i.e., (13,700); 37.9 percent of the aircraft (i.e., 5,150) and
37.5 percent of helicopters (i.e., 1,500). Each Alliance (NATO
and WTO) had to negotiate the entitlements for its members
consistent with these ceilings. Following the dissolution of the
Soviet Union the successor states agreed to limitations for each
state at Tashkent on May 15, 1992. Additional adjustments were
made upon the division of Czechoslovakia. Table 1 contains all
the CFE entitlements for the participating states (referred to as
treaty limited equipment (TLE). The treaty also requires that
states place a portion of their allocation in designated
permanent storage sites (DPSS).
Lastly, the treaty also places additional restrictions on
the so-called "flanks" (see Figure 1). This area includes all of
Romania, Bulgaria, Moldova, Armenia, Georgia, and Azerbaijan. It
also consists of the North Caucasus and Leningrad Military
Districts of the Russian Federation and the southeastern portion
of Ukraine. The total, for example, for Russian forces in this
area is 700 tanks, 1,280 artillery pieces, and 580 ACVs in active
units for this area. It further allows the Russian Federation to
place 600 tanks, 400 artillery pieces, and 800 ACVs in DPSS in
the northern portion of the flank (i.e., Leningrad Military
District). The flank zone concept was the result of efforts by
Turkey and Norway. Neither country wanted to see Soviet forces
removed from the Central Region only to reappear on their
borders.
In addition to the revised totals for each of the emerging
states of the former Soviet Union, two other official statements
by the Soviet Union deserve particular mention. First, the
Soviets formally announced on June 14, 1991 that all treaty
limited equipment (tanks, artillery, and armored combat vehicles)
assigned to naval infantry or coastal defense forces count
against their total authorized TLE. This was to assuage concerns
that the Soviet Union might transfer large amounts of equipment
from the army to its naval forces in order to circumvent treaty
obligations. The second commitment went into effect at the same
time and acknowledged the requirement of the Soviet Union to
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destroy roughly 14,500 pieces of TLE east of the Ural Mountains
(i.e., outside of the area of the treaty). The first of these
statements is considered legally binding on the Soviet Union
while the second is construed to be a political obligation. These
responsibilities were also acknowledged in the Tashkent Agreement
by the Russian Federation and Ukraine as successor states of the
USSR.
The treaty also contains numerous other specifications that
would logically be required in effecting an agreement of this
complexity. It includes careful definitions of such diverse
topics as "groups of parties," "artillery" (must, for example, be
100mm or larger), and "designated permanent storage sites." It
further lists procedures for the establishment of the Joint
Consultative Group (JCG) consisting of representatives from every
state involved in the treaty to monitor problems that may occur
during implementation, proper methods of verification, the
requirement for periodic exchanges of information, etc.5
Treaty Analysis.
While the amount of equipment and geographic limitations
imposed are important, they are still only a technical reflection
of the strategic goals that both sides had when the negotiations
commenced. The objectives of the CFE Treaty are described in its
mandate. They include strengthening stability and security in
Europe through the creation of balanced conventional forces;
establishing lower levels for conventional armaments and
equipment; eliminating disparities prejudicial to stability and
security; and, as a priority, precluding the capability for
launching surprise attacks or large scale offensive operations.6
These conditions are an appropriate mechanism to evaluate
conceptually whether or not the United States should continue to
participate in the implementation of the accord.
Despite the tremendous changes in the world since 1990 the
treaty continues to foster the objectives outlined and remains in
the best interests of the United States for several reasons.
First, the stabilizing limits established mean that no
participating signatory can exceed its agreed limit in any
category of forces or increase its allowed CFE-reduced arsenal
without both the concurrence of all the other members in its
group and corresponding reductions by one or more states in the
group to avoid exceeding the allowed alliance total.
Consequently, it has prevented arms racing throughout the
continent. Curiously while this may be most important in troubled
areas in the CIS such as the Russian Federation and Ukraine, it
also provides Hungary the means to prohibit the expansion of the
Rumanian military and Turkey a mechanism to limit Greece.7
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Second, it enhances conventional deterrence by expanding the
"transparency" states have with each other"s military forces and
further reduces the possibility of accidental conflict.
Deterrence is further advanced by the asymmetrical nature of the
reductions which in the aggregate requires NATO to reduce only a
fraction of the amount required of the former members of the
Warsaw Pact and results in balanced forces between the two
"groups of states parties."
Third, the treaty requires states to notify participants of
change in the size and character of their military forces and
provide an annual exchange of information. Fourth, the strict
inspection and verification regime insures compliance. This,
coupled with information exchanges, insures that all members have
a great deal of predictability in forecasting the military forces
of their neighbors. Lastly, while requiring all sides to live up
to stringent requirements the treaty also establishes a clear
momentum in the process which may bear fruit in other areas.
It is important to remember that the United States was also
able to protect certain operational objectives during the
negotiations. These included the maintenance of Alliance unity,
exclusion of nuclear weapons from the discussions, exclusion of
naval forces in the negotiations, preservation of American rights
to store prepositioned material in Europe, and avoidance of the
mandatory disbandment of withdrawn U.S. forces or any permanent
limitations on the overall size of U.S. forces.8 These advantages
have not been compromised by events since and may be even more
important today.
Consequently, it would make little to no sense for the
United States to consider abrogating the treaty. This is
particularly true in light of the changes that have occurred in
Europe and a desire to reflect those changes in reduced U.S.
troop presence. Furthermore, while the members of NATO have
differed on many aspects of policy, there is absolute unity in
the desire of all Alliance members for the treaty to be fully
implemented and insure its establishment as a key element in the
overall European security framework. This is also true in legal
terms as there would hardly seem to be the extraordinary
circumstance that has jeopardized U.S. security (as outlined in
Article XIX) which would allow withdrawal. In summary, the treaty
appeals to the enlightened self-interest of the United States as
well as its Alliance partners. The national security of the
United States is far more effectively enhanced by the final
implementation of CFE than by its abrogation.
Implementation.
Implementation of the treaty has progressed surprisingly
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well. The verification regime established targets for states to
achieve during a 40- month period. The lengthy time of
implementation is due to the overwhelming complexity of the
treaty and the monumental task of either removing or destroying a
vast array of equipment. This amounted to roughly 32,000 pieces
of TLE for the Warsaw Pact and 16,000 for NATO (this includes
East German equipment to be destroyed by the Federal Republic
following reunification). The initial target (September 1993)
required each state to meet 25 percent of their reduction
requirement for each type of equipment. Goals of 60 percent by
September 1994 and 100 percent by November 1995 were also
established. Flank limitations go into effect in November 1995 as
well. At that time 4 months is allocated to verify residual force
levels of all states parties before the treaty is declared fully
implemented. When that is accomplished a review conference of all
signatories will be convened to discuss difficulties, possible
changes to the treaty, and potential future agreements.
It is perhaps axiomatic for successful arms control
agreements that they receive their most intense public scrutiny
during the negotiations, and little attention is paid to the
implementation process. If that is true then CFE has been very
effective to date with little to no fanfare. All states parties
with the exception of Armenia and Azerbaijan (due to the ongoing
conflict in Nagorno Karabakh) reached their reduction goals in
September 1993 and also for 1994. Overall, roughly 18,000 pieces
of TLE have been destroyed in the former Warsaw Pact alone and
approximately 6,000 of this was accomplished by the Russian
Federation. None of the inspections of this process has revealed
discrepancies of a significance to suggest circumvention or
violation of treaty provisions.
The process of implementation has also changed to meet the
evolving international conditions in Europe, and this has
presented NATO with opportunities as well as difficulties. The
preamble of the treaty includes a clause which commits the
signatory to strive "to replace military confrontation with a new
pattern of security relations based on peaceful cooperation."9
Though the agreement is very specific in its technical content,
it does not provide any description about how these new
"patterns" are to be accomplished. The creation of the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) which includes all of the
former members of the Warsaw Pact as well as NATO was done in
some measure to adjust the security environment in light of the
demise of the Warsaw Pact (one of the two "group of states
parties" described in the accord). This has resulted in an
increase in the flow of information and ideas on the conduct of
implementation, to include seminars on verification run by NATO
for NACC members, attendance by Eastern European officers at the
NATO arms control inspection course, and access to NATO"s
verification data base (VERITY) which now provides on-line access
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to many capitals in the former Warsaw Pact. These new contacts
have been formalized as NATO"s Enhanced Cooperation Program.10
Difficulties have arisen, however, in the desire of the former
members of the Warsaw Pact to conduct so-called "East-on-East"
inspections. These demonstrate the emerging security concerns of
Central European countries but also reduce the total number of
inspections available to NATO of those states in the East of
particular interest (i.e., the Russian Federation and the
Ukraine). In addition, the creation of NATO"s Partnership for
Peace (PfP) may expand these possibilities into such things as
the participation of non-NATO participants in Western inspections
as a PfP "event." It may also allow non-signatories to the CFE
Treaty (e.g., Slovenia) who have joined PfP to participate or
observe the conduct of inspections.
The Problem of the "Flanks"
Despite the optimism generated by the obvious progress,
serious difficulties have arisen which may imperil final
implementation of the CFE accord. The most serious of these is
the request by the Russian Federation and Ukraine to be relieved
of the Article V limitation on the amount of TLE that can be
located in the flank areas of their country which consists of the
Leningrad and North Caucasus Military Districts (see Figure 1).
U.S. officials were first made aware of these concerns in early
1993.11 General Grachev (Russia's Minister of Defense), returning
from an inspection tour of military units in the Transcaucasus,
stated that the "geopolitical situation has changed" since the
treaty had gone into effect and that Russia ". . . now finds it
necessary to reconsider the armed quotas envisioned by the (CFE)
accords." Later Grachev"s press office reported that a Defense
Ministry Collegium had discussed the pressing problem of CFE
quotas and "expressed concern" that CFE limitations were forcing
Russia to distribute arms in the European part of the country
"without taking account of security interests."12
Curiously, the problem of the flanks was formally presented
to the JCG by the Ukrainian ambassador on September 14, 1993.
Ambassador Kostenko pointed out that the flank limits were ". . .
completely unjustified at the present time." Their implementation
would force the Ukraine to defend one quarter of its territory
with only 17 percent of its tanks, 7 percent of its ACVs, and 22
percent of its artillery.13 This was quickly followed by a rather
abrupt letter from Russian President Yeltsin to all NATO leaders.
Yeltsin noted the drastic changes that had occurred in the
political situation on the continent, the increased turmoil along
Russia"s borders, and the complex economic and social problems
the Russian Federation was suffering in the redeployment of
massive numbers of troops from Eastern Europe as his principal
rationale. Yeltsin also observed that the two districts
constrained by Article V (Leningrad and North Caucasus) comprise
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over half the territory of European Russia and the restraints
imposed were discriminatory as they were not imposed in a similar
fashion on any Western state. Finally, the President noted that a
solution to this problem needed to be reached quickly so that
Russia could conduct the redeployment of its forces properly and
construct sufficient infrastructure.14
First Deputy Chief of the Russian General Staff Lieutenant
General V.M. Zhurbenko underscored the seriousness with which his
country took the issue in remarks delivered in October 1993.
General Zhurbenko described the changes that have occurred in the
world since the end of the Cold War and expanded on the rationale
provided by President Yeltsin. He observed that the flank limits
placed the Russian Federation in a position of "unjustified
discrimination," forced Russia to place the majority of its
forces along the Western borders in contravention to the treaty"s
stated objectives, and denied his country the necessary forces to
deal with rising instability in the Caucasus.15 He proposed the
suspension of Article V of the treaty as a means to solve the
problem and further suggested that Russia would be willing to
consider certain additional guarantees such as a prohibition on
any increase in the military forces assigned to the Leningrad
Military District, no "over concentration" of forces in the North
Caucasus, and a willingness to limit forces in the Kaliningrad
Region.
Since these initial proposals Russian statements on the
issue have appeared in almost every JCG plenary. One can discern
a degree of increased concern about the matter as time has
elapsed. For example, the Head of the Russian Delegation V.N.
Kulebiakin commented in January 1994:
. . . if someone is nourishing the hope that, by not
doing anything but waiting for the end to the period of
reductions the problem of the flank restrictions will
disappear in and of itself, these reckonings are
absolutely groundless. If in the next six months this
knot has not been untied,
then it will necessary to cut
it. (Emphasis added.)16
In April Kulebiakin cited recent analysis by Chief of the
Russian Armed Forces General Staff, Colonel General M. Kolesnikov
in an article published in Kraznaya Zvezda (Red Star). General
Kolesnikov observed that a decision on this issue could not be
postponed because of the need for ". . . clarity today to choose
Russia"s optimum defensive configuration and prepare the
appropriate infrastructure to build our forces." Kolesnikov
concluded that if some kind of accommodation is not made ". . .
then we see the fate of the treaty in danger."17 Finally, in June
1994 First Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Russian Armed
Forces, Colonel General V.M. Zhurbenko addressed the JCG and
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again warned:
We think that the Treaty may be wrecked not by an
amendment which results from objective changes in
circumstances and existing realities, but rather by a
deaf and impenetrable wall erected on the path of
adaption of individual treaty tenets to these new
conditions. It seems that several countries have become
so enamored of the Treaty to its very last letter, that
they are ready to suffocate it in their embraces of
inviolability.18 (Emphasis added.)
Overall, the rationale presented by Russian spokesmen in the
JCG and elsewhere has been fairly consistent during the
intervening year since the Yeltsin letter in explaining why the
treaty should be changed. The Russian leadership has essentially
presented seven arguments in its analysis. First, the drastically
changed political environment in the world makes the basis for
the treaty and its bloc-to-bloc character no longer valid. In
this regard the treaty unfairly discriminates against Russia by
placing internal restrictions with respect to where forces may be
positioned on its territory. Second, the new Russian military
doctrine which has now been approved by the government and
parliament requires a more all-around balanced military defense.19
Third, the logic of the flanks has changed. Whereas previously
the North Caucasus Military District was considered a rear area,
it is now a border district.20 Consequently, it is illogical to
expect that the deployment of only 15 percent of Russian forces
is adequate in an area (the Leningrad and North Caucasus Military
Districts) that is over half of European Russia. Fourth, the
rising threat to stability, particularly in the southern area due
to Muslim fundamentalism, is the greatest challenge to Russian
security. To meet this threat General Grachev commented in a
press interview on March 2, 1994, "Today, the North Caucasus
Military District, is the base, the main district of the Russian
armed forces." Fifth, the North Caucasus Military District is
better suited to station forces returning to Russia due to its
climate as well as economic and social reasons. There already
exists some of the necessary infrastructure for returning forces
in this region. Sixth, changes to the treaty do not represent a
precedent as it has evolved over the intervening years. Russian
spokesman normally cite the example of the Baltic states leaving
the treaty upon achieving their independence as well as the
addition of new states (i.e., the former members of the Soviet
Union, the Czech Republic, and Slovakia).21 Finally, several
Russian spokesman have privately suggested that while the Russian
government strongly supports the treaty its key elements remain
the reductions and associated inspections. They argue further
that despite this fact the treaty is not well-regarded by many
members of the military. A display of flexibility by the West on
this issue would serve to dispel the lingering doubts of many of
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these critics.22 Russian leaders have also been quick to point out
that they seek no increase in the total allocation of TLE under
the CFE accord but rather simply the removal of the flank
restriction on what could be positioned in the flanks.
There have also been signs that Russia is now moving in the
direction of being outside the flank limitations in November
1995. Lieutenant General Kharchenko, Deputy Chief of Staff of the
Armed Forces, reported to the JCG in February 1994 that the
Russian military was taking into account improved command and
control and structural changes as it positioned forces returning
from Germany. As a result, ". . . we shall have on the southern
flank approximately 600 tanks, around 2200 armored combat
vehicles, and about 1000 artillery pieces (not counting temporary
deployment possibilities)".23 This would obviously suggest that
Russian forces would be far in excess of the 700 tanks, 1280
artillery pieces, and 580 ACVs they are authorized for the
entirety of this area as well as the Leningrad Military District.
Some analysis has suggested that overall Russian forces could
exceed their CFE entitlements in the flank areas by about 2000
ACVs, 400 tanks, and 500 artillery pieces.24 Russian planners have
been keen to point out that the CFE Treaty establishes ". . . the
clear cut guidelines for the new military policy of Russia and
development of her Armed Forces." With this is mind and based on
announced figures this excess equipment would amount to roughly
the equivalent of three mechanized divisions.25 Furthermore,
General Grachev stated in a press conference in March 1994 that
"the formation of mobile forces in the North Caucasus Military
District to include three airborne brigades, an airborne
division, and two motorized rifle brigades has already started."
There is also evidence that Russian military planners are
proceeding now to insure sufficient facilities are available to
accommodate the planned force irrespective of the resolution of
the flank issue. Russia has underway an extensive military
housing construction program in the North Caucasus at 15 military
bases. This housing is being built to accommodate the ground and
air units that have arrived in the North Caucasus since 1992. A
Russian press report in November 1993 listed over 9000 new
apartments being constructed during the period 1992 to 1994 at 8
of the 15 locations.26
Russian experts have suggested several solutions to this
problem. Initially, proposals focused exclusively on the total
suspension of Article V of the treaty which established the flank
limitations. Alternatively, the suggestion has been made to
remove the North Caucasus from the flanks and recategorize it as
a "rear district" which would change the map associated with the
Treaty. This was coupled with some of the previously made vague
assurances about the level of forces in the Leningrad Military
District, no "over concentration of forces" in the North
Caucasus, the right under the treaty to station large quantities
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of equipment in Kaliningrad would not be abused, and the
implementation of these changes would not ". . . prejudice the
security of any State Party to the Treaty."27 In February, the
Russian Federation added more ideas which attempted to avoid any
interpretation of a "change" in the treaty but rather a
"reinterpretation" of key portions. This included the exemption
of naval infantry and coastal defense forces from flank limits,
since this was part of a Declaration by the Soviet Union
considered an addition to the treaty but not an integral part of
the text. They further suggested that the authorization to remove
equipment from designated storage which was allowed as a total
for each "group of states" be reinterpreted to mean that each
state party had this allowance. This would be coupled with the
right to "temporary deployments" to create the force desired.28 In
a statement that did little to advance this argument, however,
General Grachev defined temporary as "forever minus one day."
Most recently Russian spokesmen have suggested that the time
period for returning TLE to storage sites (established as 42 days
in Article X) be considered a "recommendation."29
While the particular remedy has changed over time, all
suggestions still appear to be viable from the Russian
perspective. Furthermore, the objective in each case seems to be
the same--to increase TLE in active forces particularly those
stationed in the North Caucasus region and establish as a
precedent that the internal limitations imposed on Russia by the
flank requirement are in essence no longer valid.
The Flank Limits and Ukraine.
The flank limitation also restricts the deployment of forces
within the borders of Ukraine (see Figure 2). This obviously
complicates achievement of a solution satisfactory to all
parties. Ukraine has also been adamant since September 1993 that
the flank limitations must be reviewed for many of the same
reasons cited by the Russian Federation. Ukrainian officials have
observed, for example, that the flank limitation stipulates that
it can position no more than 7 percent of its total TLE
allocation in a portion of the Odessa Military District which
takes up nearly one quarter of its entire territory.30 Ukrainian
totals on the flank are:
Tanks

ACVs

Artillery

Active units
DPSS

280
400

350
0

390
500

Subtotal

680

350

890
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Ukrainian defense experts have argued that their country
requires a more balanced distribution of its forces.
Implementation of the flank limitations would force them to
position the majority of their forces in the Carpathian Military
District which would seem to be in contravention of a stated NATO
goal of reducing forward deployed forces. Furthermore, they
observed that a solution to this problem must be found by the
middle of 1994 in order to give military planners sufficient time
to react.31 Obviously, this problem is further exacerbated by
changes brought about by the dissolution of the Soviet Union and
emerging problems between Russia and Ukraine. This includes the
disappearance of the Kiev Military District which was shared with
Russia, the presence of Russian forces in eastern Moldova, and
emerging Russian nationalism in the Crimea. In addition, the
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Russian Federation and Ukraine have yet to settle the final
distribution of TLE assigned to the Black Sea Fleet which still
includes a significant amount of equipment.32
In essence, this is an issue of sovereignty for Ukraine as
it attempts to establish itself as a mid-level power and not the
"spinoff of an old empire." The Ukrainians have also been
somewhat wary of the Russian Federation receiving any relief on
the flanks for obvious security reasons. Finally, implementation
of the flank limits presents the Ukrainians with a tremendous
economic problem. It would require them to abandon infrastructure
currently available in the restricted area and construct new
facilities in the Carpathian Military District and Northern
Odessa which they simply cannot afford based on their severe
economic difficulties. In September 1994 General Gennadiy Gurin
reported to the JCG:
Under the present conditions of our economy, we do not
have the means needed to relocate troops in order to
fulfill the flank limits, and we want only one thing -to retain the existing infrastructure of military
units. Proposals tied to the possibility of disbanding
troops do not stand up to criticism, since disbanding
troops is more expensive than relocating them, due to
the unavoidable costs of providing housing for
officers" families, paying compensations, etc.33
The Ukrainians have concluded that the simplest solution is
to exempt the naval infantry and coastal defense forces from the
sublimits established by the flank limitations, while retaining
the rule that they would count against overall national totals.
While this might have the desired effect, it is unclear how this
would resolve the continuing impasse between Ukraine and the
Russian Federation over the Black Sea Fleet and would also
require a similar accommodation being offered the Russian
Federation.
While there is no doubt that this seeming impasse given the
flanks is a threat to the full implementation of the CFE Treaty,
the manner in which it has unfolded does contain some positive
aspects. All efforts by the parties involved (particularly Russia
and Ukraine) appear to have been overt. Even the construction of
infrastructure that may lead to forces in excess of the flank
limitations has been reported publicly. No attempt to disguise or
hide the problem and the difficulties associated with it has been
made. Furthermore, all parties have used the Joint Consultative
Group to air the issues. As a result, the procedures established
in the treaty have been working, but one can still question
whether this forum is sufficient to resolve the conflict. Lastly,
the Russian military has been "out in front" on the issue in
military-to-military contacts.
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The NATO Response.
The public response of NATO members has emphasized the
position that the CFE Treaty is the "cornerstone of European
security." Consequently, it cannot be renegotiated and to do so
would establish a bad precedent for other arms control forums.
This includes not only the basic text of the treaty but also all
related documents, protocols, and declarations. Furthermore, the
Russian Federation freely accepted the treaty as negotiated to
include the agreements with the former members of the Warsaw Pact
and declarations by the Soviet Union prior to its demise. As a
result, any alteration to these documents such as those proposed
can not occur until the review conference which will occur in
spring 1996. Furthermore, Russia has not sufficiently explained
the analysis of new threats to its frontiers that substantiates
the removal or modification of flank limits.
The West has also suggested that the treaty provides
sufficient "flexibility" to meet Russian needs. Representatives
of the United Kingdom and the United States have observed the
following possibilities: First, Russian troops in the North
Caucasus could be "light" forces equipped with equipment that is
not limited by the CFE Treaty (e.g., trucks, infantry weapons,
small calibre artillery, and certain tracked vehicles that are
not part of the ACV category). Such a force would also seem more
appropriate to the terrain of the Caucasus as well as the threats
of internal instability. Second, the Russians should recognize
that there is no flank limitation for their aircraft (either
fixed or rotary wing) which can be rapidly moved from zone to
zone to meet any emerging threat. Third, they could deploy
additional ACVs and other tracked vehicles with their internal
security forces as allowed in Article III and XII (which do not
count against their overall CFE total). Article XII, for example,
allows for up to 1,000 ACVs to be placed with internal security
forces (only 600 in the flank area) and not be counted against
CFE totals. It does not, however, allow for any transfer of tanks
or artillery to such forces. Fourth, equipment for Russian units
in the CFE flank zone could be stored outside the area but close
enough for rapid deployment in time of crisis. Fifth, Russia and
Ukraine might also seek to renegotiate their allocation with the
other former members of the Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan,
Georgia, and Moldova).34 The total in the flank area for these
countries amounts to 870 tanks, 870 ACVs and 1,105 artillery
pieces which, though not an insignificant force, is insufficient
to satisfy the demands of Ukraine and Russia previously
discussed. It is also unlikely that any of these states would be
willing to give up sizable parts of their allocation, since their
respective portions are relatively small and ongoing conflicts in
the region involve several of them.
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Other members of NATO have shown more or less willingness to
compromise within the NATO High Level Task Force (HLTF) due in
large measure to how such an alteration would affect their
respective security. Throughout the implementation period Germany
has appeared sensitive to Russian concerns and has previously
cosponsored proposals with Russia for less costly destruction
procedures. Germany has also proposed that the timetable for
equipment destruction might be extended, or that excess equipment
not destroyed at the end of the reduction period could be placed
temporarily at secure storage sites pending final destruction.35
France has been uniformly opposed to any concessions to the
Russian Federation out of fears that they could result in
multiple proposals by other signatories on portions of the treaty
they find objectionable, thereby threatening the entire basis of
the accord. Obviously, Turkey and Norway have been outspoken
opponents to any compromise based on the fact that they border
the flank areas.36 They echo the doubts of France and,
furthermore, Turkey believes that Russia maintains imperialist
ambitions in the Caucasus region and is the primary motivator
behind hostilities in Georgia as well as the war between Armenia
and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakh. An increase in forces in
the flank area would also reduce the warning time available to
Turkey and Norway and thus be counter to their security
interests. Lastly, a dramatic change in the CFE Treaty or its
overall demise could open the way for a new European or regional
arms race. Consequently, Turkey has also hinted that any
concessions to the Russians could result in an overall Turkish
review of continued participation in the accord. Due to the
intense feelings by the Turks and Norwegians, NATO has not yet
agreed upon a formal Alliance approach to solving this problem.
As the treaty nears the end of the implementation period, it
seems increasingly clear that some solution to this impasse must
be found. While the technical details may differ and the degree
to which the Russian Federation is willing to compromise is
unclear, certain key factors are evident. First, NATO needs to
decide in the High Level Task Force (HLTF) precisely what it
means by the phrase "within the flexibility allowed in the
treaty". This is fundamental to maintaining a united front in the
negotiations; will avoid an interpretation by the Russian
Federation that NATO can not accept; and also avoid any
possibility of a "take it or leave it" confrontation in November
1995. Russian objectives at this stage may be to meet the overall
national levels with enough ambiguity so as to argue compliance
in November 1995. In determining an acceptable level of
flexibility the Alliance should also consider that the Russian
Federation must offer something to the states most affected-Turkey and Norway. This could include such things as Russian
assistance in the settlement of the war in Nagorno-Karabakh,
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buffer zones, or additional inspections allocations for these
areas.

Second, all Alliance members (especially the United States)
need to avoid any appearance of this issue becoming bilateral
between their country and the Russian Federation. Russian tactics
in the negotiations so far seem focused on emphasizing its
"strategic partnership" with the United States, and other
attempts to split the Alliance depending on the type proposal
presented or assurances offered. In many ways Alliance members
need to be aware of the stress these negotiations place on the
Alliance.
Third, every effort must be made to frame the result in a
fashion that avoids any renegotiation of the treaty. This implies
at this stage that the JCG must remain the forum for finding a
compromise. The treaty allows for the calling of an
"extraordinary" conference but this is doubtful due to the short
time remaining. Consequently, a dichotomy exists as all members
realize that the European security landscape has changed
significantly since 1991 but to reopen the negotiations on this
treaty would either doom it to failure or at least a significant
period of discussion.
Fourth, NATO members need to quietly but firmly remind the
Russian Federation of the severe penalties associated with
noncompliance in this forum and others. As discussed at the very
onset of this study, arms control can not occur in isolation. The
Russian Federation could lose substantial aid (particularly due
to the congressional requirement to certify treaty compliance)
and its entry into the G7 by flagrantly violating the accord.
Fifth, a solution must be found to the problem of Ukraine
that may differ from the overall settlement. The future of
Central Europe may well be defined in terms of the relationship
established between Ukraine and Russia. From a strict security
perspective the Ukrainian problem is more persuasive than the
Russian Federation. Furthermore, the severe economic deprivations
occurring in Ukraine add credence to their statements that they
will be unable to comply due to financial limitations.
Finally, NATO members must have no illusions. They cannot
wish the problem away. To do so risks "winning the game and
losing the treaty." The prospects for a "last minute" compromise
or change in Russian attitudes are unlikely, particularly in
light the recent hostilities in Chechnya and elsewhere in the
flank area. It is conceivable that the Russian Federation might
declare itself fully in compliance with the treaty in November
1995 and "challenge" the West to argue that interpretation. This
would place renewed strains on NATO and U.S.-Russian relations.
It would make a compromise extremely difficult politically given
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the impending Russian parliamentary elections (December 1995) and
Russian presidential elections (June 1996) not to mention the
upcoming American presidential elections.
The Russian Response.
In assessing the depth of Russian willingness to compromise
it may be useful to examine some additional factors affecting
this problem from their perspective. There can be no doubt that
this issue serves as a surrogate for broader internal and
external problems facing the Russian Federation. It illustrates,
for example, the ongoing friction between several players in the
Russian "bureaucratic politics" process. The Russian military was
skeptical of the agreement from the very onset and questioned
whether or not it had been left with adequate resources to defend
the political and territorial integrity of the country.37
But the military is far from a unitary actor. The
appointment of Pavel Grachev as Russia"s first Minister of
Defense caused resentment among senior officers on the General
Staff which has continued.38 Grachev has also had serious
disagreements with Colonel General Nikolayev, head of Interior
Security Forces, over resources, the potential transfer of army
assets to border troops, and major military exercises.39 There
have also been differences among the military, Foreign Ministry
and the Office of the President over such issues as Russian
participation in the Partnership for Peace. Foreign Minister
Kozyrev, for example, was initially viewed by many as too proWestern and willing to accept Western arms control proposals, but
more recent analysis has suggested that there is a growing
convergence between the positions he and the military have
adopted.40 Finally, several political parties during the 1993
elections advocated Russian rejection of CFE as well as the START
II accord as being counter to Russian national security
interests.41 These tensions have led some to suggest that civil
authorities may be losing control of the military42 and
consequently may not be able to force a compromise on their own
military leaders. The attitudes of these various groups are
unlikely to slacken and may in fact harden as the deadline for
final implementation approaches. It will be difficult for
President Yeltsin to compromise on this issue and risk being
perceived as weak before the Russian presidential elections in
June 1996. It should also be understood that this is viewed as a
"military" problem to the Russian Federation while in many ways
it is a "political" problem for the United States. Russian
critics of the treaty, while describing the "flank issue" as
discriminatory, have pointed out repeatedly how the treaty has
placed the Russian Federation in an overall position of
inferiority. Many Russians argue it is a concerted effort to
"keep Russia down" and indicates a lack of willingness on the
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part of the United States to develop a true "strategic
partnership." Aleksey Arbatov, Director of the Geopolitical and
Military Forecast Center, noted in an article in Novoye Vremya
Following the execution of the CFE Treaty, in the
latter half of the 1990"s, the balance will be the
opposite (in NATO"s favor), and the ratio of forces
between Russian and NATO will be 1:2.8 in favor of the
West. If, on the other hand, the former Soviet Warsaw
Pact allies are added to NATO, the balance will be
1:3.7. If, however, for strategic extrapolation
purposes, the forces of former Soviet Republics in the
European zone which are now independent states are
added to the West, the ratio becomes 1:4.5 to Russia"s
disadvantage.43
Consequently, the resolution of this problem is tied not
only to Russia"s relations with the West but also to its future
relations with the former members of the CIS, perceived
responsibilities toward the so-called "near abroad" (Russian
citizens living outside the borders of the federation), and
concern for strife on their borders. The view that Russia is
threatened by future external and internal threats (particularly
in the Caucasus) is also reflected in the new military doctrine.
This document suggests that priority must go to the restoration
and expansion of a mutually advantageous relationship between
Russia and the other members of the CIS to meet these challenges.
Furthermore, Russia proceeds from the fact that its security is
indivisible from the security of the other Commonwealth States.44
In other words, Russia considers its forward defense to begin at
the borders of the former Soviet Union and not the Russian
Federation.
Not surprisingly one of the primary objectives of Russian
foreign policy is the integration of the border states of
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Ukraine, and Moldova into the CIS
as a security alliance not unlike NATO.45 This will logically
result in the stationing of Russian forces on the territory of
these states, which will count against their overall flank
limitations. Some experts believe that elements of the Russian
military have pursued a policy of destabilizing several of the
regimes in the Caucasus in an effort to encourage their reentry
into the CIS. Russian military commanders may have provided arms
to both Armenia and Azerbaijan in their war over Nagorno-Karabakh
in an effort to ensure the continuation of that conflict. It
supported the rebels of Abkhazia until they appeared on the verge
of defeating the Georgian government. Once Georgia agreed to join
the CIS and cede basing rights to Russian forces, Russian troops
came to the aid of the Shevardnadze government.46
With this policy in mind, Russian leaders have argued that
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the Russian Federation, working within the authority of the CIS,
should have the primary responsibility for peacekeeping
operations within the borders of the former Soviet Union. Foreign
Minister Kozyrev initially broached this issue in a speech given
to the U.N. on September 2, 1993. Kozyrev sought recognition and
financial support for Russian peacekeeping operations in the
"near abroad." He argued:
Either we learn to conduct military actions to support
and establish peace in the zones of our traditional
geopolitical interests or we risk losing influence
there and the vacuum will be filled by others.47
General Grachev also raised this issue in discussions with
Secretary General Boutros Ghali in early 1994. Grachev argued
that if the conflict in Rwanda involves the Organization of
African Unity and peacekeeping operations in Haiti include
members of the Organization of American States, why should
operations by the CIS not be sanctioned under the Charter of the
U.N.?
Grachev also asserted that forces assigned to peacekeeping
operations and their authorized armaments should not count toward
the maximum permissible levels under the CFE Treaty. Otherwise a
difficult situation would arise in which the deployment of units
trained for peacekeeping (such as the 45th Motorized Rifle
Division based in the Leningrad Military District) could not be
replaced while operating in Tajikistan or elsewhere in the CIS.48
This concept was again reiterated by President Yeltsin during his
address to the U.N. and subsequent summit with President Clinton.
Yeltsin asserted that Russia has similar rights to that of the
United States in quelling disturbances on its borders. He added
that, "The main peacekeeping burden in the territory of the
former Soviet Union lies upon the Russian Federation."49
Obviously, this has significant implications for the flank
problem. Russian thoughts on peacekeeping are embedded in its new
doctrine and are quite different from those normally found in
similar Western publications. The Russian military does not
necessarily view "peacekeeping" as normally low intensity
conflict that can be accomplished by light forces. Rather, it
sees such efforts as operations needed to head off the expansion
of a conflict and consequently appropriate for heavy forces. In
this regard it is frequently mentioned that the Russian word
mirotvorets, which is generally translated in English as
"peacekeeper," literally means "peacemaker." Russian experts on
peacekeeping often use their operations in Afghanistan as
illustrative. General Boris Pyankov, who is responsible for
peacekeeping in the Russian General Staff, observed: "Here in
Russia, everything is the other way round . . . first we use
overwhelming force, then we bring the parties to the negotiating
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table."50 In a June 21, 1994 Red Star interview, Russian Deputy
Defense Minister Colonel General Georgy Kondratyev noted that the
Ministry of Defense was preparing 2-3 motorized rifle divisions
for peacekeeping (making) operations.51 He further reported that
by the beginning of 1995 Russian airborne forces will no longer
have the primary role in peacemaking operations. The use of heavy
mechanized forces in Chechnya may be further evidence of the
Russian penchant to use "overwhelming force in peacemaking."
In the summer of 1994 roughly 3,000 Russian peacemaking
troops deployed to the Georgian-Abkhazian border.52 Some reports
suggest that Russia may eventually have two divisions deployed to
Georgia. The Status-of-Forces agreement between the two countries
allows basing facilities for two divisions (at T"bilisi, Batumi,
and Akhalkalaki), the presence of Russian border guards on the
Georgian-Turkey border, use of Georgian airspace by Russian
military aircraft, access to all telecommunications facilities,
joint operations of all training facilities, and a lease to the
Poti Naval Base for the Russian Black Sea Fleet. A similar
arrangement has been achieved with Armenia with the possibility
of one Russian division on its territory. Moldova also has one
"peacemaking" division and pressure is being placed on Azerbaijan
to accept Russian "peacemakers." It is also likely that Russia
will wish to maintain a significant force in Chechnya which will
make the flank limits even more burdensome. In summary, a
combination of Russian foreign policy and a reluctance on the
part of other U.N. members to become involved in peacekeeping
along the southern border of the Russian Federation may offer the
Russian military an additional argument for exceeding their flank
authorizations.
Other Problems.
Besides the flank issue, only two major obstacles seem to
confront the final implementation of the treaty--cost and Russian
military equipment that was moved east of the Urals prior to the
treaty coming into effect. Several of the countries of the former
Soviet Union (most notably Russia, Belarus and Ukraine) are
experiencing serious problems due to the dramatic cost associated
with the destruction of equipment in accordance with the strict
procedures outlined in the treaty. In an article in Kraznaya
Zvezda on November 16, 1993, Russian experts complained that the
cost of destroying a single tank was over 800,000 rubles at
current prices.53 This problem has been reviewed in the JCG and
simpler methods have been discussed to destroy equipment
including even considerations of so-called "environmental
destruction." Under this procedure equipment to be destroyed
would be segregated and exposed to the elements so that over time
it was rendered militarily useless.
Despite these efforts, however, alternative means of
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destruction may not resolve the problem for several reasons.
First, the cost of destruction in these countries is affected by
three supplemental factors--the use of high numbers of laborers
to effect destruction, rising costs of energy to run the
facilities, and a desire to recover the maximum amount of metal
from the weapons in the process. Obviously alternative
destruction procedures may solve the CFE problem while creating
others such as greater unemployment, reducing the possibility of
recovering the metal, and also will result in a serious
environmental cleanup requirements.
As discussed earlier in this monograph the Soviet Union
agreed to destroy roughly 16,000 pieces of TLE which it had
transported east of the Urals and out of the AOA as a commitment
related to the treaty. Russia assumed this responsibility as part
of the Tashkent Accord although this has always been considered a
"political" rather than "legal" requirement. By the middle of
1994 Russia had destroyed only a fraction of this equipment. It
would need to dramatically accelerate its current effort to
achieve the required total by November 1995. Curiously, the
Russians have resisted offers of assistance in the destruction of
this TLE though most of it appears to have been stored out in the
open and may be now of little military value. This is probably
due to a bit of paranoia and a desire to keep inspections in the
eastern part of the Russian Federation (that portion of the
country not covered by CFE) to an absolute minimum. Still the
requirement remains and Western countries need to achieve
consensus on their policy should (as it now appears) the Russian
Federation be in violation of this commitment by the end of this
year. Several general ideas come to mind. First, NATO must
continue to impress upon the Russian Federation that this is a
serious, albeit political requirement. Second, since it lies
outside of the AOA of the treaty, alternative means of
destruction are permissible and should be encouraged. Third, the
segregation of these storage areas into known locations would
allow the West to monitor the progress on destruction and status
of the TLE using national technical means. In addition, the entry
into force of the "Open Skies Treaty" in the spring/summer of
1995 may offer an additional means to monitor the status and
readiness of this equipment.
The Future--Where Do We Go Now?
If the treaty is in fact implemented and the verification of
residual levels is accomplished a Review Conference will occur,
most likely in April or May 1996. It is important for U.S.
policymakers to begin to consider what will likely be "on the
table" at this conference. Furthermore, it is important to
contemplate what U.S. policy should be with respect to future
conventional arms control regimes in Europe.
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The CFE Treaty is designed to continue with no time limit.
Still if solutions are found to the difficulties discussed here
there may be cause for only a brief respite, and it is certain
that several issues will be of immediate interest at the review
conference. There is no doubt that Russia and Ukraine will
immediately press for the removal of Article V covering flank
limits at the onset of any Review Conference. It must also be
recognized that several states from the East may insist that the
"bloc-to-bloc" character of the Treaty disappear since one of the
"groups of states parties" is gone. This may be inevitable, but
its implications must be thoroughly considered now in preparation
for future discussions. First, many of the limitations which are
ascribed to "groups of states parties" (such as equipment placed
in DPSS) would probably be raised. These could be converted to
national totals, but this might result in higher entitlements for
some countries. Second, it would reduce the flexibility that NATO
now has to shift forces or entitlements between members of the
Alliance. Lastly, it would have important implications for the
post-1996 verification regime and for the allocation/conduct of
inspections. Furthermore, destruction procedures and costs must
be reviewed. Some participants have already questioned whether or
not the destruction of TLE below authorized levels must be done
along the strict guidelines established in the treaty. The treaty
is certainly mute on the issue of what procedures states parties
may use to maintain numerical limitations once residual levels
have been verified in the spring of 1996.54 Lastly, it seems clear
that there is little interest in extending the agreement to other
pieces of equipment or negotiating lower levels of TLE for the
participating states though there has been some suggestion in
Russian publications of an interest in the inclusion of naval
forces in the arms reduction process and the limitation of naval
activities.55 Still, while there may be little interest in
extending the treaty to other categories of equipment, close
attention must be paid to continually update the Protocol on
Existing Types of Conventional Armaments and Equipment (POET) in
order to categorize new models as they are brought into service.
Article XVIII of the treaty does state that states parties
". . . shall continue the negotiations on conventional armed
forces with the same mandate and with the goal of building on
this Treaty."56 With this in mind many experts have argued that
the agreements reached in the Forum for Security Cooperation
(FSC) in Europe have created a requirement to seek a
"harmonization" of CFE limitations among its 30 signatories with
the confidence/security building measures (CSBMs) by the 52
members of the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE). The initial proposal in this area was presented by the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia in October 1992. It
proposed the creation of national force levels for non-CFE states
(in many cases this might simply be a declaration of current
levels with no need for reductions). In addition, appropriate
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commitments for information exchange, verification, and
implementation of the CFE Treaty would have to be made by these
additional states.57 Obviously, those states currently
participating in the CFE accord would be required to notify these
states (primarily the former "neutrals and non-aligned"--Sweden,
Finland, Austria, and former Yugoslavian states) of their maximum
levels.
So far there has been little overall interest in this
proposal by those states who are not currently signatories to the
CFE Treaty (e.g., Finland, Switzerland, Sweden, etc.) for several
reasons. As suggested at the very beginning of this monograph,
arms control is used a means of reducing tensions between states.
Therefore, it has little possibility of success when states are
engaged in warfare and may have little meaning or momentum when
they enjoy good relations. Consequently, the Swiss have openly
questioned the value of such an agreement, and the possibility of
including Serbia in such an agreement is extremely unlikely prior
to the resolution of current hostilities. The interest of the
neutral states is also tempered by the nature of their respective
militaries and views on deterrence. Most of these countries
depend heavily on reserve forces and militias for their defense.
A verification regime that included a detailed transfer of
information on mobilization procedures, depot locations,
restrictions on the activities of these forces, etc. is construed
by many experts in these countries as not contributing to
improved national security or deterrence.
There have also been suggestions on the creation of socalled "regional tables" that could either build on previous
agreements or use the concepts applied in CFE to reduce tensions
in particular areas. In Europe, the suggestion has been applied
to the former Yugoslavia in an initiative led by Hungary in
OSCE.58 There have also been some suggestions that the Baltic
states (Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania) would also be interested
in this type of arrangement because of their concerns over
Russian forces stationed in the Leningrad Military District.
Outside Europe scholars have speculated that such arrangements
might have application for the Far East or Middle East. In this
regard it is extremely interesting that the Republic of Korea,
Japan, and Macedonia have observer status at OSCE negotiations,
and there is some belief that Israel may also apply for a similar
position. While such an approach would seem consistent with the
regional focus of U.S. strategy, it must be recognized that the
prospects for success in these areas appear slight. Enormous
problems such as defining the "region," the mandate, and role of
the great powers would have to be solved prior to the beginning
of any such negotiation. The key to this approach may be to
develop an arms control dialogue in tandem with a more formal
peace process. Neither is likely to achieve decisive results by
itself, but together they may create the critical mass necessary
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for a settlement.59 In a similar fashion there have also been
proposals to refine a number of the current CSBMs and create
others for the trouble spots in the OSCE area.
All of these harmonization proposals seem focused on
transforming the arms control process in Europe from a
"quantitative" to a "qualitative" effort, which certainly seems
logical. But at a more fundamental level, there are serious
implications for the United States that must be considered. At
its ultimate extreme, "harmonization" suggests the transformation
of OSCE into a regional organization that coordinates security
activities on the European continent and would logically place
NATO in a subordinate role. This may be desirous and is certainly
supported by various segments of European officials. French
experts, for example, support this approach as necessary to ". .
. establish the structures and procedures that are required to
allow Europeans to act autonomously if necessary."60 Foreign
Minister Kozyrev from the Russian Federation has also proposed
the conversion of OSCE into a full fledged international
organization with "a genuine division of labor between the CIS,
NATO, European Union, NACC, and WEU with the OSCE playing a
coordinating role." He further suggested that OSCE create a
governing body of 10 members to deal with the requirement for
consensus prior to action.61 Such action could be dangerous. It
would dramatically reduce the role of the United States in
European security and could become a means for the Russian
Federation to legitimize the CIS as a regional organization while
undermining NATO.
In preparing for the future, one other area may be
appropriate to consider. There seems little doubt that the
character of arms control among the CFE participants is moving
towards qualitative aspects and crisis prevention. Still the
United States and Europeans (to include the former members of the
Warsaw Pact) bear a heavy responsibility in the fueling of
conventional arms races and conflicts around the globe. In 1993,
the U.S. sold $33 billion in government-to-government arms sales.
Russian military doctrine has stated a goal of exporting
sufficient arms to earn enough hard currency to sustain
research/development, insure production for domestic use, finance
limited defense conversions, and "ensure the social protection of
personnel employed in defense industries."62 As we enter the CFE
sustainment period with a reduced requirement for equipment due
to smaller force levels, there will be increased pressure in many
states to expand exports in order to maintain industries and
employment. Consequently, it may be prudent to consider the use
of the CFE/OSCE forum for a discussion on not only future
destruction/verification procedures but also national
conventional arms export policies, with the view of limiting
sales to regions experiencing turmoil and greater international
incentives being offered for states to convert excess defense
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industrial capacity.63
As we consider what role conventional arms control should
have in future U.S. national security strategy, it is essential
to remember that it remains a means to an end. It is also
important to maintain a short and long term perspective. In the
near term the final implementation of CFE is not assured, and
will not occur without concerted action by the United States. For
the future we must remember that our arms control policies have a
tremendous resonance in broader areas having to do with the
future of the U.S.-European relationship. As a result answers to
wider questions may well serve as a guide to arms control
policies. Does the United States wish to continue its role as the
leader of NATO with the Alliance being the premier security
organization on the continent? What is the U.S. policy towards
the assertion by the Russian Federation of a preeminent role in
the security affairs of the former members of the Soviet Union?
While certainly these are questions of tremendous complexity, it
is still necessary to keep in mind that seemingly "tactical
choices" now in CFE may define their ultimate answers. How the
United States and its allies deal with the problems in the final
implementation of CFE as well as American policy towards the
Review Conference will contribute significantly to establishing a
framework for future U.S. policy towards Europe.
The United States and its NATO partners won a tremendous
victory in the Cold War through their policies and perseverance.
CFE is described by many as a "cornerstone for European security"
in the future. Having achieved this peace it remains to be seen
how we build on this cornerstone to achieve a "secure and
lasting" peace.
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